The article is a brief response to the main thesis of the famous book by Levy-Bruhl "Primitive Thinking" (Moscow, 1930), in which he claims that representatives of primitive tribes have a primitive thinking that is different from modern man, distinguished by pre-logicality, that is, illogicality, mysticism, and inconsistency. In this article, I show with examples that modern European scientists are distinguished by the same pre-logical thinking, and the whole difference lies only in the cultural and historical development of thinking, noted by L. Vygotsky.

The article proves that the instruction used by a person in the Chinese room is the carrier of meaning. And if a person learns it by heart, we have the right to believe that he will understand Chinese as a foreign language, even if the instruction itself is in English. The error in reasoning about the Chinese room is that the author separated the manipulation of symbols from their meaning, as if they were different substances. But according to L. Wittgenstein, "meaning is use" (of symbols). Therefore, the conclusions from the mental experience of the Chinese room are, in the author's opinion, erroneous.

The article shows that from the arguments tested by E. Wigner, one can draw completely different, opposite and more plausible conclusions. Wigner has to resort to the "miracle" argument to draw his conclusions. The article also shows why mathematics is really effective as a tool for thinking, and not on the basis of a unique property of the world. An explanation is given for the quite understandable effectiveness of mathematics based on an analysis of the need for a priori rules for the possibility of obtaining knowledge as such.

Research into the origins of counting among primitive peoples shows us that it was formed as an operation with the body - fingers, hands, elbows, feet, and not as a registration of some external countability existing "in the world". Below it will be shown how logical ordinal counting was formed from figurative counting. In support of this hypothesis, the author's thought experiment "brains with a manipulator" is given. It demonstrates that not only counting, but also an idea of ​​the space around the brain can only be obtained by counting bodily movements. This makes it possible to assume that even such a priori forms of knowledge as spatial representations and time are bodily conditioned.

How do you know if a bot has consciousness? This is the question that will be answered in this article. Based on the proposed theory of consciousness as the ability to reflect on one's actions, the author proposes a test of consciousness as answers to a sequence of questions about the reasons for statements, which, in the author's opinion, can only be answered at any time and without evading the answer by a subject who truly has consciousness of his internal motives, while imitation will certainly show its limit.

The strange "psychiatric syndrome" of Cotard gives the opportunity to go beyond the usual idea of ​​one's own "I". People suffering from this syndrome believe that they are dead, and their body has rotted. This kind of illness undoubtedly has interesting philosophical implications. The most brief, but at the same time fully scientific side of the issue is presented in the article [Debruyne et al. 2009]. Below are philosophical reflections inspired by the data of modern psychiatry. In it, the author shows how in the distorted idea of ​​the sufferer about his "I" his true nature as will is revealed.

The article provides a new solution to the "hard question of consciousness" that explains why all previous solutions to the "mind-body" question have failed. The author of the article describes a new theory of consciousness and its structure that allows one to explain the phenomena of consciousness and to study consciousness experimentally. The solution is based on a hypothesis about the model of the environment in the constructive paradigm of cognition, which allows one to explain the "hard question" without contradictions and hypothetical assumptions.